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Introduction to Special Issue on Discursive Psychology 
 
The aim of this special issue is to showcase current research in discursive psychology. It 
emerged out of a conference panel at the International Conference on Conversation 
Analysis in 2018, a four-yearly event that was held, in its 5 th iteration, at Loughborough 
University, in the UK. Its origin in this particular conference rather than, say, a British 
Psychological Society event, is relevant to the aims and approaches of the papers, as they 
all combine discursive psychology (DP) with conversation analysis (CA), in the tradition 
established by the “Loughborough School” of social psychology (Stokoe, Hepburn, & 
Antaki, 2012).  
Discursive psychology’s origins lie in several influential domains of psychology, 
including the pioneering sociology of scientific knowledge-inspired discourse analysis laid 
out in Potter and Wetherell (1987); Billig’s (1987) approach to rhetoric and argumentation; 
Edwards’s (e.g., Edwards & Mercer, 1987) fine-grained analysis of classroom interaction, and 
Antaki’s (1988) excavation of practices for everyday explanations. In the mid-1990s, after the 
term ‘Discursive Psychology’ was first formulated (Edwards & Potter, 1992), DP drew 
further on and closer to conversation analysis, with which it had strong epistemological 
affinities and with which it has since developed a mutually beneficial methodological 
partnership (e.g., Antaki, 1994; Edwards, 1997; Potter, 1996b). By adopting CA as its primary 
analytic framework, DP developed an inductive, data-driven approach for the detailed 
empirical examination of practices of conduct that comprise everyday life. This has opened up 
new spaces for psychological investigation and theorising allowing discursive psychologists 
to “capture” and study identities, attitudes, emotions, and other psychological phenomena “in 




for the outcomes of the interactions. As DP has reached maturity, via numerous 
methodological debates between discursive psychologists and scholars within neighbouring 
fields (e.g., Coulter, 1999, 2004; Hammersley, 2003b, 2003c, 2003d, 2003a; Potter, 2003b, 
2003a; Potter & Edwards, 2003; Speer & Hutchby, 2003) it still fosters some productive 
methodological diversity (Billig, 2009) and polemics (Billig, 1999b, 1999a; Schegloff, 1997, 
1999b, 1999a; Wetherell, 1998) while continuing to draw on, contribute to, and sometimes 
challenge CA (Stokoe, 2020).  
This special issue brings together DP studies that address key psychological topics, 
mainly (but not exclusively, see Alexander & Stokoe, this issue) by undertaking a 
respecification of core psychological constructs. Thus, the papers engage in discussions with 
well-established bodies of psychological knowledge around, among others, attitudes, 
persuasion, and personality. Before introducing the papers, let us first review DP’s position 
within, respecification programme for, and contributions to psychology. 
1 Discursive psychology within the context of psychological science 
For psychology, DP embodies the “turn to language” that has permeated the social sciences in 
the second part of the 20th century. DP approaches psychological phenomena through either 
social constructionist or ethnomethodological frameworks thus challenging the social 
cognition paradigm to which psychological science has adhered in the last 70 years. These 
frameworks led to a shift both in the ingrained epistemological assumptions that are brought 
to bear on the investigation of psychological phenomena as well as in the methodological 
practices related to the collection/generation and analysis of empirical evidence.  
Within psychology, DP has argued and provided evidence for the need to treat 
language as a medium for action and not as a “window” to the mind (Edwards & Potter, 




individuals’ responses to stimuli are means of getting at their psychological processes rather 
than social actions worthy of investigation. Discursive psychological research has 
demonstrated time and again that and how we “do things with language”, even in 
experimental settings (Gibson, 2013; Leudar & Antaki, 1996). But, to study language-in-
action, discursive psychologists had to step outside the experimental laboratory or the 
interview room and take a recorder to the settings where life happens. Thus, DP, through its 
methods of data collection, distinguishes itself not only from quantitative and experimental 
psychology, but also from other well-established qualitative methodologies. 
Discursive psychologists have studied extensively what are traditionally conceived of 
as “core” psychological topics such as memory, attitudes, prejudice, identity, and emotions 
(Tileagă & Stokoe, 2016). But many psychologists, especially in North American psychology, 
remain unfamiliar with the established DP theory, method, and findings. This is due not only 
because DP’s respecification of psychological topics is incongruous with longstanding 
cognitive conceptualisations of, say, attitudes, memories, attribution, or emotion (Edwards & 
Potter, 1992); but also because much of psychology is constrained by its (quantitative, 
experimental) methods, and because it is often wrongly assumed that DP is a subsection of 
qualitative or critical psychology without understanding how radically different it is to, say, 
the methodologies of thematic analysis, or interview-based work (Stokoe, 2020). 
Three decades of findings from DP studies seriously challenge established, but often 
normative, cognitive representations of psychological phenomena, rendering discursive and 
mainstream psychology difficult to reconcile, with DP often taking a critical stance on 
cognitive psychology (Edwards & Potter, 2005), experimental (Antaki & Leudar, 1992; 
Leudar & Antaki, 1997), survey (Antaki, 2006; Antaki & Rapley, 1996) and qualitative 
methods (Potter & Hepburn, 2012; Puchta & Potter, 2004). By re-examining core 




rhetorical, and interactional organisation of psychological constructs, which has led to their 
respecification from veiled, individual cognitive processes to demonstrable, shared discursive 
practices. By focusing on the natural, practical, and intersubjective organisation of 
psychological business in and through discourse, DP’s respecification programme, which we 
present next, has endeavoured to revolutionise psychology in a similar way to how 
ethnomethodology has transformed sociology (Garfinkel, 1988). 
2 Discursive psychology’s programme of respecifying psychological 
topics: from cognitive constructs to discursive practices 
Discursive psychology’s respecification programme encompasses a set of methodological 
procedures that set apart DP from other qualitative approaches within psychology. First, DP 
takes an inductive approach to examining psychological topics, by bracketing theoretical 
assumptions about the investigated phenomena. DP studies deconstruct and debunk deep-
rooted, previously unexamined assumptions about fundamental topics. For instance, instead of 
treating gender as an explanatory factor for human behaviour, DP has examined how gender 
categories are used in constructing exculpatory accounts (Stokoe, 2010) or how they are made 
relevant in the course of mundane actions such as making a compliment (Edwards, 1998). 
While, DP is theoretically agnostic (but see Billig, 1987; Gibson, 2019), analytically, it builds 
on and uses findings from previous interactional studies, leading to a robust, cumulative, and 
closely intertwined body of knowledge.  
Second, discursive psychologists consider language to be a medium for action 
(Wiggins & Potter, 2007) which has radical epistemological implications for how we use data 
in DP research. How individuals talk and what they actually say, whether in response to 
survey questions, to the experimenter in the lab, or to their best friends on the phone, 
constitute discursive actions with real-life consequences. For DP, verbal and written discourse 




configuration of cognitive structures which presumably underlie human conduct should no 
longer be inferred from discourse.  
Third, how then can human conduct be explained, if we question the assumption that 
our behaviour is governed by cognitive structures? Following Sacks’s (1984, p. 22) 
programmatic observation that in mundane social interactions “there is order at all points”, 
DP treats any stretch of talk or text as the product of a set of formal procedures and rules that 
can be identified and described. Consequently, the task that DP sets for itself is to document 
the rules that govern the organisation of psychological business in and through discourse.  
Fourth, instead of (re)creating memories or attitudes in the experimental lab and 
“putting them under the microscope”, DP looks for setting in which people spontaneously 
recount and assess past events for instance when they share their first impressions of others 
(Humă, 2015). DP studies have sought to explicate “how psychology is constructed, 
understood, and displayed as people interact in everyday and more institutional situations” 
(Wiggins & Potter, 2007, p. 73). The relocation of psychology from the lab to mundane 
settings and the treatment of discourse as action has led to discursive psychology preferring 
data that pass the “dead social scientist’s test” (Potter, 2002, p. 541), mainly texts and 
embodied talk-in-interaction (1) that are produced without the researcher having to instigate 
them and (2) that are naturally and endogenously organised by co-present individuals 
(Goffman, 1983).  
As a result of these meta-theoretical and methodological choices, findings from DP 
research are hard to reconcile with mainstream representations of psychological topics as 
primarily reliant on the workings of cognitive processes (Potter, 2003a). It is worth 
emphasising that DP does not take an ontological position that negates the existence of 
cognitive structures apriori (Edwards & Potter, 2005; Iversen, 2016). Instead, by studying 




that human conduct can be explained without appealing to the workings of a “box of cognitive 
wires” that underlie behaviour. DP does not dismiss the existence of cognitions, instead, we 
study them as manifestations in discourse, as individuals’ concerns in and tools for interaction 
(Edwards, 1997). Finally, DP does not disavow mind-body, objective-subjective, or inner-
outer dichotomies, but instead it examines how individuals construct and use these 
dichotomies in and through discourse (Edwards, 1999).  
How do these meta-theoretical options translate into a scientific approach for studying 
psychological phenomena in and as part of the social arenas where they occur spontaneously 
and where they matter for individuals? In the next section, we highlight the main theoretical 
and methodological innovations through which DP has contributed to the study of 
psychological phenomena as discursive practices.  
3 Discursive psychology’s key theoretical and methodological 
contributions 
Over the last 30 years, DP has not only provided new insights into the interactional 
organisation of psychological phenomena but has also pioneered new procedures and 
techniques for the study of naturally occurring social interaction. In this section, we review 
the main theoretical and methodological contributions of DP, with three aims. First, we set out 
to explicate how DP’s meta-theoretical assumptions (presented in the previous section) 
translate into research practices. Second, we hope to demystify DP by addressing some of the 
most frequent misconceptions about DP as a research method. Third, we aim to show how 
DP’s inductive empirical approach achieves methodological integrity and rigour in accord 
with the standards for qualitative research (Levitt et al., 2018) while also developing its own 
quality standards. Specifically, we will highlight that and how DP employs ethical, 
systematic, and topically adequate data collection procedures as well as transparent, detailed, 




prior research findings, thus producing a cumulative and internally coherent body of 
knowledge (Potter, 1996a).  
3.1 Pioneering an inductive approach to naturally occurring data collection  
The preference for recording naturally occurring data, which DP shares with other methods 
for studying social interactions – conversation analysis, ethnomethodology, and membership 
categorisation analysis – forms the bedrock of a DP study’s validity: audio and video 
recordings constitute a selective but “good enough” record of what happened: “Other things, 
to be sure, happened, but at least what was on the tape had happened” (Sacks, 1984, p. 26). As 
such, interaction analysts start with an accurate and undisputable representation of the 
phenomenon of interest (Peräkylä, 2011). 
In line with an inductive ethos, DP (as well as CA) studies set out with only a few 
predefined parameters. The first step in such a study consists in carving out a topic of interest 
for investigation, for which there are two approaches. First, a study can originate in the 
interest to explore the discursive practices of an established psychological construct such as 
attitudes (Potter et al., this issue), personality (Alexander & Stokoe, this issue) or agency 
(Weatherall, this issue). The specificity of the topic can range from generically investigating 
attitudes as discursive actions (Wiggins & Potter, 2003), to more focused subjects such as the 
management of racial attitudes (Potter & Wetherell, 1988), to even more focused themes such 
as the subtle manifestations of racism in official governmental documents (Popoviciu & 
Tileagă, 2019). On this basis, discursive psychologists formulate one or more exploratory 
research questions, while still allowing the investigation to develop into new and exciting 
directions. For psychologists who are used to operating with hypotheses and strictly 
operationalised variables, this approach may appear as an unsystematic and haphazard 
endeavour (Potter, 1996a). It is not. This flexibility ensures the adequacy between research 




researcher, after an initial inspection of the data, to rethink the aims of the study in order to 
integrate unanticipated empirical insights.  
Discursive psychologists need to identify real-life settings in which the phenomena of 
interest occur unprompted in ways that matter for co-present individuals. For instance, Huma 
et al.’s study of persuasive conduct (this issue) is based on recordings of “cold” calls in which 
salespeople try to get appointments to visit prospective customers. In this study, “cold” calls 
serve as a “natural laboratory” (Stokoe, 2018) where persuasion crops up spontaneously, as 
part of sales work. By choosing this setting, the researchers were able to explore the natural 
organisation and interactional outcomes of persuasive practices which would not be otherwise 
available for inspection, for instance through prompting individuals to recount their 
experiences of persuading / being persuaded.  
But how can we ensure that the phenomenon of interest will indeed spontaneously 
recur, in a particular setting, without researcher elicitation? To some extent, like in any 
inductive approach, it is not possible to predict what we will find in the data. Prior familiarity 
with the setting achieved through personal experience with it, and by reading ethnographic 
accounts or prior interactional studies conducted in similar environments, is helpful for 
determining the suitability of the setting for the topic of the study. In any case, speculations 
about the presumed difficulties of working with naturally occurring phenomena because of 
their unpredictability have proven to be unfounded (Stokoe, 2009). For example, the notion 
that studying topics like ‘gender’ or ‘racism’ would be like searching for “the proverbial 
needle in the haystack” (van Dijk, 1987, p. 119) is a key argument for conducting interviews, 
to guarantee the required content. However, several studies of membership categories in 
action (inter alia Kitzinger & Mandelbaum, 2013; Stokoe, 2010; Stokoe, Sikveland, & Humă, 
2017; Whitehead & Lerner, 2009) which have demonstrated the “capturability” of categorial 




Separately, a solution to this conundrum consists in using already available corpora 
with which we are familiar and in which we have noticed, on previous occasions, instances of 
the phenomenon we are interested in. This option is made possible by the richness of naturally 
occurring data, which lend themselves to multiple interrogations in a range of different ways 
(Gill, 1996). At any single time, there are multiple levels of organisation that operate 
simultaneously within conversations. For example, participants manage their relationships 
with each other, their respective epistemic and deontic rights in numerous jointly produced 
courses of action, activities, and projects. Therefore, while working on one aspect of a 
conversation, researchers can become interested in other phenomena co-present in the setting, 
which will then be the subject of subsequent empirical investigations. For example, Hepburn 
and colleagues have examined different forms of social influence in parent-children 
interaction during mealtimes, such as threats (Hepburn & Potter, 2011), the negotiation of 
food intake (Wiggins & Hepburn, 2007), and admonishments (Potter & Hepburn, 2019). 
Building on this, Hepburn’s article featured in this special issue, puts forward a 
respecification of “socialisation” as a situated practice relying on parents systematically 
withholding directive actions, thus showing an orientation to a preference for self-direction as 
a means for accomplishing socialisation-in-interaction.  
3.2 Ethics in and as action 
Accessing a research setting in order to record interactions is not always straightforward. One 
should not underestimate the ethical and practical challenges that come with accessing the 
selected setting. For most institutions, gaining the support of gatekeepers constitutes a key 
step, before informed consent from participants can be sought (Wiggins, 2017). Studies that 
rely on naturally occurring data require ethical approval even when the interactions-to-be-
examined are already recorded, as standard institutional practice, such as calls to emergency 




incoming/outgoing telemarketing conversations (e.g., De Stefani, 2018; Stokoe et al., 2017) or 
police interviews with suspects and victims are already being recorded (e.g., Jol & Stommel, 
2016). 
If accessing a setting of choice becomes problematic, online media platforms can 
provide an alternative source of data. Publicly available video recordings from platforms such 
as YouTube and Vimeo (e.g., Laurier, 2013) as well as TV (e.g., Demasi & Tileaga, 2019) 
and radio broadcasts (e.g., Horowitz & Kilby, 2019) can be of use, as long as they are live, 
unscripted, and as much as possible unedited. Finally, there is a growing availability of data 
corpora1 that can be accessed by researchers interested in language-in-interaction.  
With increasingly strict rules around the use of personal data (e.g., the General Data 
Protection Regulation applicable in the European Union), provisions for storing and handling 
naturally occurring data securely need to be made well in advance of data collection, usually 
as part of ethical approval applications. As we collect and store recordings containing 
participants’ personal information, we are required to minimise the risks associated with the 
management of data, through increased security and safeguarding measures. These include 
storing the data on password protected, encrypted institutional devices, using pseudonyms in 
publishable transcripts as well as anonymising audio and video recordings and stills of the 
later featured in presentations and publications (Information Commissioner’s Office, n.d.). 
Many qualitative researchers may opt to dispose of digital recordings once the projects have 
been completed or, increasingly tend to make recordings and/or transcripts publicly available 
in data repositories. By contrast, discursive psychologists, like conversation analysts, tend to 
                                                          
 
1 For example, the CallFriend corpora (several languages) set up by the Linguistic Data Consortium or the 




privately store collected data which, due to their richness, can be revisited in subsequent 
projects.  
DP’s contribution to research ethics stretches beyond devising strict procedures for 
safely and securely handling of private, sometimes highly sensitive data. DP, like CA, is 
effectively equipped to problematise and empirically investigate ethical practices within 
mainstream psychological research. Such a study, undertaken by Speer and Stokoe (2014) 
found that obtaining free, non-coerced informed consent from participants is more difficult 
than anticipated due to the preference structures which operate in talk. By examining 
sequences of consent gaining, DP can feed back into ethical guidelines which could be 
improved by taking into consideration the contingencies of ethics-in-action. 
3.3 Transcription as incipient analysis 
Preserving the rich detail of how talk-in-interaction unfolds, as captured in video and audio 
recordings, in subsequent visual and textual representations of the interactions is a central 
concern for discursive psychologists. The transcription process is based on a system invented 
by Gail Jefferson (2004) (2004), and subsequently further developed to capture, for instance, 
crying (Hepburn, 2004) and multimodal conduct (Mondada, 2018). Like music notation, the 
system enables researchers to produce consistent and transparent transcripts. However, 
anybody who has ever transcribed even a few minutes of talk-in-interaction will know that 
capturing every single aspect of an embodied conversation is impossible. The transcription 
process is necessarily selective (Mondada, 2018) and, of course, the data are the recordings, 
not the transcripts. Discursive psychologists aim to produce transcripts that are attuned to 
their studies’ analytic objectives, which leads to transcribing being regarded as an incipient 
analytic stage (Hepburn & Bolden, 2013; Wiggins, 2017). 
Conversation analytic transcriptions appear, also like music notation, hard to decipher 




often accused of including ‘too much’ detail, and that the details are unnecessary, or 
distracting, thus rendering the analysis difficult to follow. For instance, in a more general set 
of caricatures of DP/CA, Parker (2005, p. 91) complains that discourse analysts in psychology 
should “Beware conversation analysis”, for its “use of detailed transcriptions that make it 
seem like you are really seeing what is there” (emphasis added). Again, we disagree. First, we 
argue that, aligned to the ostensible goals of much qualitative and critical psychology, 
transcripts that aim to represent exactly what and how people say things maximizes the 
‘giving voice’ to research participants. DP/CA studies have demonstrated that prosody, 
silences, pronunciation, overlap, or volume of talk-in-interaction are relevant and 
consequential for the interactional business that individuals are engaged in – often for the very 
purposes of exposing the workings of power, asymmetry, and so on. The point is that detailed 
transcripts are not ‘too’ detailed – they represent what people actually do. To create 
impoverished transcripts would, we argue, give less voice to participants. Thus, producing 
Jeffersonian transcripts is a moral and ethical decision.  
Another way to think about this is in the context of studying online communication. 
Presumably researchers do not delete emojis or punctuation marks when examining, say, 
WhatsApp or SMS messages, as they are considered to be integral by the writers who put 
them there. Thus we posit that, by omitting these fine, but crucial details of talk-in-interaction, 
other qualitative traditions, that use verbatim (orthographic) transcripts and “correct” 
individuals’ talk, are in danger of failing to accurately represent their participants “voices” 
(Aguinaldo, 2012; Potter & Hepburn, 2005b; Roulston, 2001), as well as rendering the actual 
conversations opaque. In DP/CA, any researcher can, if the right permissions are in place, re-
analyse it with their own questions in mind. Indeed, DP/CA is committed to open data, and 




Once transcripts have been produced, the original data – the recordings – remain are 
necessary throughout the analysis process. For video data, discursive psychologists often need 
to go back to re-transcribe or check other details of the interaction. Transcribing qualitative 
data, especially when using the Jefferson and the Mondada systems, can be a time-consuming 
process; however, the close engagement with the data pays off analytically as researchers 
become immersed in the setting they are examining. 
3.4 Transparent and accountable collections of discursive practices 
Transcribing the data requires a set of analytic decisions regarding the selection of relevant 
aspects of the interactions to be represented visually and in writing on the transcripts, thus 
constituting the first step of the analytic process (Potter, 1996a). Annotating the data and 
building collections require further analytic judgments as researchers interrogate the data for 
instances of the phenomena of interest. Again, we should emphasise that these are not 
theoretical principles; in fact, discursive psychologists strive to treat their data, which often 
depict familiar settings, such as family mealtimes or shopping encounters, as 
anthropologically “strange” (Gill, 1996). This requires bracketing theoretical assumptions 
about these interactional environments in favour of revealing relevant practices in the data. 
The systematicity and reliability of this analytic endeavour relies on annotating being 
an iterative process which requires the researchers to go through the data several times, each 
new reading being informed by prior ‘noticings’. This requirement ensures that annotations 
are coherent and consistent across the data set while also being grounded in empirical 
observations. Through several rounds of annotations, researchers identify stretches of talk – 
extracts – that can form collections of possible relevant cases of the target phenomena. The 
composition of a collection, which is over-inclusive at first, is likely to change as researchers 
move from annotating the data to analysing each extract in the collection. As the practices  




eliminated from the collection, on the basis that they do not exhibit the identified practices . 
Conversely, researchers may decide to go back to the data corpus to now search for a specific 
discourse practice. 
Creating a collection of relevant cases constitutes one of the challenges for DP 
respecification studies which do not start with predefined notions of how psychological 
constructs figure in discourse. Instead discursive psychologists set out to discover the 
discursive configurations of psychological phenomena through inductive and iterative 
scrutiny of the data. Hence, the creation of collections relies on initial noticings of potentially 
relevant stretches of talk which are then marked for further analysis. A word, phrase, turn or 
sequence is considered to be potentially relevant if it features discursive practices employed to 
achieve some action or interactional effect related to the topic of the study. For some 
psychological phenomena, the identification of relevant practices can rely directly on 
participants’ use of vocabularies vernacularly associated with those phenomena. For example, 
researchers can track psychological predicates used to index putative mental states and 
processes such as “concerns” (Potter & Hepburn, 2003), “wants” (Childs, 2012), or 
“thoughts” (Barnes & Moss, 2007). However, at times, the discursive management of the 
psychological phenomena may occur in more subtle ways, especially when the phenomena 
are tied with participants’ stakes in constructing versions of events. A case in point comes 
from a study of intentionality in police interviews with suspects. Recurrently, in these 
interviews, the police officer tries to establish whether the suspect has committed the crime 
with intention or accidentally (Edwards, 2008). Intention here can be made relevant via direct 
references such as a police officer asking, “Did you inte:nd to cause any damage to the 
window of the car” (p. 184) or via elaborate descriptions of suspect’s actions, and their 
thoughts regarding their anticipated effects. The value and novelty of DP lies in enabling 




topics even when participants do not employ terms and phrases that are predictably associated 
with these topics. 
 While it is not possible to establish a strict procedure for building collections, based 
on the papers in this special issue, we can delineate three main approaches for identifying 
possible relevant cases for DP collections for respecification studies. Probably the most 
straight forward process of searching for and collecting instances of talk that feature particular 
psychological topics consists in searching for terms that index manifestations of the 
phenomenon. This strategy has been employed by Flinkfeldt in her paper on the invocation of 
a “worry” in welfare encounters. Her collection was built by searching for lexical terms that 
index negative emotions such as “concern”, or “fear”, and then extended with the inclusion of 
metaphoric expressions such as “lying sleepless”. A second strategy for building a collection 
of candidate instances of a respecified psychological construct consists in tracking the 
linguistic resources, other than psychological predicates, that are recurrently used to 
accomplish some action or interactional effect related to the phenomena of interest. This 
strategy is exemplified by Weatherall’s paper in which the author has systematically collected 
proposals that either feature the speaker (I-formatted proposals) or the recipient (YOU-
formatted proposals) as the agent doing the future action. She demonstrates how the design of 
these actions is intimately tied to issues around agency and responsibility for the proposed 
actions. Both strategies presented so far pose minimal challenges for the researchers arguing 
for the relevance of their collections for the topic of interest. By contrast, the third option is 
somewhat less straightforward because it relies on researchers collecting sequences of talk in 
which the topic of interest is demonstrably accomplished, while not being explicitly referred 
to. An example of this strategy is Hepburn’s paper that respecifies children’s “socialisation”. 
In her data, the parents do not talk about socialisation, they “do” socialisation by designing 




and commands. Hepburn’s collection consists of cases in which parents can be seen to 
withhold directive behaviours and instead build opportunities for children to display agency 
over their own conduct. 
Building a DP collection relies on criteria that are worked out in and through the 
process of examining the data; however, it does not mean that the criteria are mysterious or 
unreliable. In fact, the “acid test” for any DP study consists in clearly and compellingly 
articulating the practices that underlie the exclusion/inclusion criteria for a collection. 
Furthermore, discursive psychologists habitually open up their analytic procedures for 
scrutiny in data sessions (Harris, Theobald, Danby, Reynolds, & Rintel, 2012), where other 
researchers can examine, comment on, or even challenge collections-in-progress. Once 
published, DP studies remain transparent by presenting analyses and the data they are based 
on together. Thus, in the context of the current ‘replication crisis’ within the social and 
behavioural sciences (Dreber & Johannesson, 2020), DP is aligned with the strive for open 
science in that readers can undertake their own examination of the transcripts and their 
analyses. While these provisions do not preclude researchers from producing poor quality 
analyses, they do provide for the most accessible, transparent, and accountable presentation of 
empirical findings. 
Collections serve the role of carving out, from the data corpus, those stretches of talk 
that exhibit a similar practice (which will be worked out in detail through analysis) that 
appears to be relevant for our target phenomenon. While annotating and building collections 
is presented here separate from data analysis – which we describe next – in DP, there is, in 
fact, no clear break-off point between these two activities. 
3.5 DP as an emic analysis of social actions 
Many novice DP scholars find analysing data to be an elusive or even baffling practice 




“craft skill” comparable to “riding a bicycle or sexing a chicken” (Potter, 1996a, p. 140). With 
no formal procedural rules to rely on, what can analysts hang on to while making sense of 
what seem, but are actually not “messy” conversations? The answer lies in two key analytic 
principles that DP shares with conversation analysis and ethnomethodology. First DP abstains 
from speculating about why individuals behave the way they do, and what their motives, or 
intentions may be. Instead, DP aims to describe discursive conduct and its constituent 
features, including how people themselves speculate – within sequences of action in 
interaction – behave the way they do. This focus on observable and demonstrable discursive 
practices renders DP analysis robust to re-analysis and scrutiny. Second, DP, like CA, 
privileges participants’ perspective and interpretation of talk-in-interaction. This approach 
keeps DP analysis grounded in what is, for participants, relevant and consequential about 
what they and their interlocutors are doing (Potter, 1996a).  
These principles inform the detailed examination of each extract within the collection 
that we have assembled. The analysis alternates between focusing on single extracts and the 
collections as a whole and, on occasion, researchers can even go back one step; to scrutinise 
the data corpus for new cases of the identified practice. There is no strict rule on what the 
analysis of a single extract should focus on. Discursive psychologists can pick out linguistic, 
sequential, or rhetorical features of the interactions, thereby relying on findings from 
conversation analysis, rhetorical psychology, discourse analysis, ethnomethodology, 
membership categorisation analysis, and interactional linguistics.  
Usually, researchers approach each extract with a set of analytic questions such as (1) 
what actions are being performed by the participants and how, (2) what version of the world is 
being constructed and by whom, (3) what are the upshots of this way of depicting events, (4) 
what is at stake, for the participants, in the interaction and how are those stakes managed, and 




of this way of constructing it (Wiggins, 2017). By answering these questions, we end up 
producing detailed descriptions of each extract, which we can then refine by focusing on the 
practices that recur across the collection. 
The iterative process of identifying regularities across the collection can also lead to 
the discovery of data extracts which do not exhibit the presumed practice. These divergent 
cases are not dismissed or omitted from the analysis, without first being scrutinised. It can 
turn out that they represent deviant cases, where the identified interactional regularities are 
infringed, while still being oriented to by the participants (Wiggins, 2017). Such cases do not 
invalidate our findings; on the contrary, they corroborate and reinforce them. They 
demonstrate that the absence of the rule/regularity is noticeable and noticed by the 
participants, which in turn further underscores its importance (Schegloff, 2007). Unlike 
survey-based studies that search for patterns across aggregated data sets and in which 
divergent cases are explained away as measurement imprecision or unavoidable variation, in 
DP studies every single case is considered informative for the practice under investigation. 
How do we validate DP analyses given that the criteria applicable to quantitative, 
deductive realist research methods are not relevant for naturally occurring interactions 
conducted within a discursive constructionist framework? Before answering this question, let 
us first highlight that DP studies have validation criteria built in at every step of the research 
procedure, as we have hopefully already demonstrated. Similarly, validation criteria are 
inherent to DP analysis through the following analytic practices (see also Peräkylä, 2011; 
Potter & Hepburn, 2005a): (1) the scrutiny of deviant cases, (2) the iterative organisation of 
the analysis, (3) the reliance on the “next turn proof procedure”; that is, participants’ 
orientations and understandings of their interlocutors’ actions, as displayed through their 
responses, in subsequent turns (Edwards, 2004), (4) the restriction of the analysis to what is 




forms of open science: the publication of data and analysis, side-by-side, allowing readers to 
fully scrutinise all analytic claims and, thus, make their own judgments. 
3.6 Empirically grounded theorising 
While DP research starts out without a theoretical framework, their empirical findings can 
contribute to psychological theorising. Nonetheless, most DP studies end up being 
incompatible with or critical of mainstream psychology. A classic example comes from 
research on attitudes, conducted more than 30 years ago and one of the bedrocks of DP. In an 
interview-based study of racial attitudes Potter and Wetherell (1988) showed that participants’ 
evaluations of racial minorities where often inconsistent, and tailored to the sequential context 
in which they were produced. This led them to suggest that the existence of underlying stable 
racial attitudes, conceptualised as evaluations of psychological objects, seemed to receive 
little support from their data. In fact, they argued, when individuals take a stance towards or 
make an assessment of a racial category, we cannot separate the object of that assessment 
from its indexical reference in talk-in-interaction, which is inherently evaluative.  
If participants’ assessments are not underpinned by attitudes-as-cognitive-objects, how 
then should we understand evaluative conduct? Discursive psychologists have demonstrated 
that evaluations and assessments are discursive actions, designed and implemented to achieve 
particular interactional effects such as managing a person’s subject-side (Edwards, 2003), pre-
empting and supressing counter-arguments (Billig, 1989), or handling alignment and 
affiliation (Edwards & Potter, 2017; Goodwin & Goodwin, 1987; Pomerantz, 1984). 30 year 
onwards, discursive psychologists are continuing to document the interactional architecture of 
assessments (Potter, Hepburn, Edwards, this issue) and to build a compelling body of 
evidence for attitudes as discursive accomplishments. 
Early DP studies of attitudes also revealed that, in formulating assessments, 




facts, evidence, or measurements – what in DP we call “object-side” assessments – or as 
individual judgements, based on personal dispositions, preferences, stakes, and interests – 
what in DP we call “subject-side” assessments (Edwards & Potter, 2017). Subsequently, DP 
has continued to investigate the discursive practices through which individuals manage 
object- and subject-side and the implications thereof in, for example, constructing credible 
accounts of paranormal events (Wooffitt, 1992), complaining about absent third parties 
(Edwards, 2005), and undermining interlocutors’ accounts (Edwards, 2007). The concern with 
object-subject relations – what Edwards (1997, 2003) has also referred to as mind-world 
relations – is pervasive across psychology. DP’s unique contribution consists in the empirical 
investigation and theorising of subject-object relations not as the researchers’ but as the 
participants’ practical concerns, managed in and through talk-in-interaction. Looking into the 
future, the exploration of subject-object relations is a promising avenue for discursive 
psychological research (Edwards & Potter, 2017). Let us now turn to the studies comprised in 
this special issue, which provide novel insight into the interactional underpinnings of key 
psychological topics, such as emotions, attitudes, knowledge, persuasion, agency, 
socialisation, and personality, in the tradition established by DP and outlined so far in this 
editorial. 
 
4 Summary of the papers in the SI  
This Special Issue of Qualitative Research in Psychology provides a propitious opportunity to 
showcase the breadth and depth of DP as a way of revealing psychological matters in and 
through members’ everyday practices. The seven empirical papers below engage with a range 
of psychological themes in both mundane and institutional environments. 
 The article by Potter, Hepburn and Edwards investigates mainstream social 




systematically showing how assessments (i.e., judgements, evaluations, attitudes) function in 
everyday interaction. Potter at al. illustrate how object (O)-side (e.g., ‘nice lady’) and subject 
(S)-side (e.g., ‘I liked her’) assessments, and combinations thereof, build particular actions - 
for instance, O-side first, S-side second utterances can build affiliation, while S-side first, O-
side second utterances can be resources to pursue further dispute. The article sheds new light 
on how the different dimensions and categories of assessments are produced, revealing the 
social and sequential organisation of interactional practices as discursive psychological 
resources. 
 Huma, Sikveland and Stokoe show how the traditional psychological concept of 
persuasion is built as an interactional practice by salespeople in business-to-business ‘cold’ 
sales calls in the UK. The authors show that successfully secured meetings with prospective 
clients are bound to particular conversational resources in turn-taking and sequence 
organisation. For instance, restricting opportunities for prospective clients to reject a proposed 
meeting by designing preamble turns as presupposing the arrangement has already been 
agreed (e.g., scheduling a meeting time). In contrast, self-invitations (e.g., ‘can we come and 
have a chat about your phone systems?’) were regularly rejected by would-be clients. The 
findings illustrate the ways in which persuasion, as a type of social influence, can be 
interactively and collaboratively accomplished in these institutional encounters through its 
respecification as a discursive psychological phenomenon.  
 The contribution by Flinkfeldt examines how formulations of the lexical ‘worry’ (e.g., 
‘I’m really worried now’) are designed in telephone calls between citizens and the Swedish 
Social Insurance Agency’s helpline, in the service of call-takers assisting with housing 
allowance issues. The analysis shows how worry formulations (retrospective, current and 
prospective formats) are epistemically bound in various ways – such as, when callers display 




unwarranted, or alternatively, as a preventative measure against potential future worry. In 
contrast, a lack of knowledge about their problem is treated as warranting a legitimated reason 
for calling the service. Flinkfeldt’s findings supplement DP’s programme of research on 
emotion-relevant topics and extend knowledge of how psychological matters are modified as 
serviceable concerns in these institutional encounters.  
 Weatherall examines how agency is displayed by call-takers when proposing 
assistance to those contacting a Victim Support helpline in New Zealand. The analysis reveals 
the ways in which assistance is designed within the remit of the organisation; in so doing, 
displaying the contrastive deontic rights of interactants (i.e., self or other) in the advancement 
of service provision. For example, formulations may be designed as call-takers having agency 
(e.g., ‘I can give you the number) or affording agency to callers (e.g., ‘you can call the police 
non-emergency number’), as well as morpho-syntactic variations in ‘I’ and ‘you’ formatted 
turn design (e.g., ‘did/do you want to…’, ‘I can/could…). The findings illustrate the various 
ways in which offers of help are collaboratively accomplished in the service of future courses 
of action. Further, the article extends discursive psychological work on how in-situ 
interpersonal relationships are built in these institutional encounters. 
 The paper by Alexander & Stokoe show how characterological formulations are 
designed to mobilise speakers and others as particular ‘types’ of people when reporting 
neighbourhood problems in calls to dispute resolution services in the UK (mediation and 
environmental health). Analysis of ‘[descriptor] person’ utterances reveals the moral work 
done by callers; designing themselves as reasonable people (e.g., ‘I’m an extremely tolerant 
person’) contrasted with their neighbours (e.g., ‘he’s a rather obnoxious person), and further, 
shows how callers’ actions are designed as a situational consequence of their neighbour’s 
conduct. Alexander & Stokoe’s article complements existing DP work in the areas of identity, 




complainable activities can be designed to shape the institutional relevance for service 
provision by orienting to the underlying character of people in favourable and unfavourable 
ways. 
 Iversen & Evaldsson demonstrate the ways in which Swedish professionals (teachers 
and counsellors) discuss school pupils’ troubles in Pupil Health Team (PHT) meetings. In 
contrast to PHT guidelines which promote the importance of professionals understanding each 
other regarding pupils’ needs, the analysis reveals that and how pupils’ issues are 
problematised as the source of misunderstanding in these meetings – for instance, the 
designedly vague formulation of a pupil doing ‘really strange things.’ Iversen & Evaldsson 
extend DP’s programme of work on the management of accountability by showing how 
professionals present themselves as not disposed to incompetence or lacking knowledge in the 
handling of morally delicate matters; instead orienting to pupils’ transgressions without 
explicitly marking out the objectionable elements of their conduct. 
 In the final empirical article,  Hepburn investigates the interactional resources that 
parents use when seeking to progress some course of action (and manage resistance to these 
bids) for their child in family mealtime interactions. Drawing on preference organisation, 
Hepburn demonstrates how more coercive practices of behaviour modification and 
management are withheld in favour of actions that provide opportunities for children to 
develop self-directed solutions to problematic behaviour – such as, holding off escalating an 
admonishment, or cajoling and interactionally deleting a failure of the child to comply. The 
article develops understanding of (dis)preference in these encounters – that a preferred 
version of a course of action is to start with lower invasion – in so doing, distinguishing the 
practice from self-correction and self-remediation. Further, the article demonstrates how the 





 The concluding commentary by Wiggins reflects on DP as a foundational resource for 
respecifying psychological concepts, and as a developing methodology across academic 
landscapes and interactional environments. Wiggins emphasises the richness of DP, 
underpinned by the rigorousness of its analytic insight. In turn, this thoughtful and engaging 
contribution affords the reader an opportunity to consider the deep and lasting impact of DP 
as a unique way of understanding social conduct. 
 Taken together, the quality and variety of contributions in this Special Issue 
demonstrate the vibrancy of the DP community; in turn, showing the value and importance of 
DP’s programme of respecification as a way of engaging with and revealing psychological 
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